behavior of police across a variety of conflict situations and within the context of underlying police-community relations provides a more informed illustration of policing practices and the role they play in escalating and de-escalating collective violence.
To examine these patterns, we analyze several riots that took place in San Boston from 1967 to 1969 . A sizeable body of scholarship has provided evidence that suggests the effectiveness of high levels of repression in suppressing protest and collective action (Feierabend & Feierabend, 1972; Hibbs, 1973; Muller, 1985; Tilly, 1978) . We diverge from this conventional wisdom, however, and argue that certain applications of high levels of direct repression will not only be ineffective at quelling riots but may in fact be escalatory, worsening an already volatile situation. The key point of departure we undertake lies in the specification of the criteria under which this counterproductive inflammatory effect seems most likely to occur, namely (a) when repression is excessive and! or racially selective, (b) when police have poor training in crowd control, and (c) when police-community relations are strained or lacking in formal connections and channels for feedback. In exploring these criteria, we begin with a brief presentation of the magnitude and character of the racial rioting in our two cities. Next, we attempt to connect these outcomes to various facets of the preriot2 conditions, particularly (a) levels of police preparedness, (b) preexisting relationships between authorities and city residents, and (c) racial differences (polarization) between both cities' populations concerning opinions and attitudes about police behavior and effectiveness. We hypothesize that the city that fairs better on measures of preparedness and police-community relations will experience a lower incidence of racial violence. Similarly, we expect the city with lower racial polarization of attitudes toward police to experience less rioting.
DATA AND METHODS
We examine data from four distinct sources, providing a tri lated view of the effect that police had on riot activity in Bost San Francisco during the riot years. Three of the data sources w archived in the records of the Lemberg Center for the Study o lence. The Lemberg Center operated at Brandeis University from 1966 to 1974 and was arguably the premier site for research on the urban riots of the 1960s. Although the center generated a wealth of data on rioting and race relations, only a fraction of the material was ever analyzed. We extract several germane elements from the re-cently rediscovered archive that we combine to recreate a detailed picture of the police-community/disorder interactions in our target cities during the late 1960s.
We chose Boston and San Francisco as our primary cases for several reasons, both practical and substantive. First, these two cities were two of a small number of cities for which all four data sources had complete information (see below for details on sources). Of those that had complete sets of data, Boston and San Francisco were specifically designated by the Lemberg Center for study as a "matched pair" (see Lieberson & Silverman, 1965 , for more detail on the matched-pair design for riot cities). Of course, no two cities selected by the Lemberg Center or any other research organization could ever score identically on every characteristic, so thinking in terms of strict statistical controls would be an unreasonable extension of the matched-pair design. Nonetheless, myriad similarities did exist between the two cities at the time, and we believe that these congruities help to minimize various demographic, economic, and cultural explanations that might otherwise account for the variation in observed riot rates. To note just a few examples, both Boston and San Francisco are coastal cities and both are far removed from the southern border. Both are predominantly cultural and educational centers relative to the minor presence of heavy industry and both are considered relatively progressive with respect to race relations (see Roper Research Associates, 1967 , for more detail on the selection mechanisms). These similarities and others help to isolate the policing dynamic from other regional, economic, and cultural factors that might account for the difference in rioting across the two cities.
NEWSPAPER ARCHIVE
One of the main data collection foci of the Lemberg Center w their newspaper archive. Starting in 1967, the center contracted a national newspaper clipping service to monitor all of the daily newspapers in the United States for accounts of race-related civil disorders. We identified all events that occurred in the target cities from 1967 to 1969 and extracted the articles that covered those events. In sum, 6 riots occurred in Boston and 20 occurred in San Francisco during that 3-year time span.
ROPER SURVEY
The second major data collection effort conducted by the Lemberg Center was a public opinion survey commissioned via Roper Research Associates that asked broadly about city conditions, race relations, and civil disorder. The survey also included important information about public attitudes toward the police and police practices prior to the riots. Accordingly, we extracted and analyzed data on all questionnaire items that made any reference to the police. We draw on the information from the Roper Survey as our first of three explanatory data sources to inform our portrayal of the preriot conditions in each city.
The Roper Survey was conducted in six major U.S. cities including Boston and San Francisco. In each city, a probability sample of approximately 500 Blacks and 500 Whites aged 18 and older was selected. The sampling frame was restricted to the city limits. To minimize bias due to interviewer effects and social desirability, interviewers were race-matched with the respondents (Roper Research Associates, 1967) . Of particular relevance to our study, the poll was conducted at the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967, prior to the onset of the most serious rioting in the United States. Thus, the Roper data provide telling background informa-tion about conditions in our cities during the early parts of the rio wave rather than reacting to the "long, hot summer" of 1967.
LEMBERG INTERVIEWS
To supplement the Roper Survey, the Lemberg Center also conducted its own in-depth interviews with approximately 40 to 60 community leaders, city officials, religious leaders, and other prominent figures from each city. The racial breakdown was split almost evenly between Black respondents and White. The interviews explored a variety of issues, including race relations, civil disorders and policing, economic and social conditions, and a variety of other topics. Although the interviews were not entirely completed before each city had experienced rioting, they provide an insightful glimpse into the state of affairs in each city, and we draw specifically from those portions of the transcripts that detail the respondents' attitudes concerning civil disorder, police-community relations, and police behavior. The Lemberg Center interviews were particularly compelling in that many of the respondents (e.g., police chiefs, protest leaders, city officials, and members of policecommunity relations boards) had specific insights into the policing situation in their cities.
ICMA DATA
The International City Managers Association (ICMA) Police Survey details a variety of internal characteristics of police departments throughout the country. Conducted throughout the 60s, the ICMA Survey gathered both general information about each police department (personnel, expenditures, etc.) as well as detailed information about riot preparedness and procedures. The LCMA data used in this study were collected in 1966 (again, prior to the dramatic surge in the riot cycle), and the survey includes information about riot personnel, action policies, crowd control strategies, and hardware (e.g., quantities of tear gas, shielding armor, clubs, etc.).
We extracted all relevant information for Boston and San Francisco
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RESULTS
Our analysis examines each of the data sets discussed above, with the tabulation and summary of rioting (based on the Lemberg
Center news clippings) as the primary dependent variable. The three explanatory data sources help connect the preriot conditions discussed above (riot preparedness, police-community relations, and racial polarization) to the levels of rioting that occurred in these two cities.
CIVIL DISORDER IN BOSTON AND SAN FRANCISCO, 1967 -1969 In the Lemberg Center's original paired-city design, San Francisco was designated as a "riot city" and Boston as a "non-riot city"
because Boston had not experienced a major race-related civil disorder prior to 1967. As the riot wave progressed, however, both cities experienced substantial yet varying rates of rioting, so it is perhaps more useful to think of San Francisco as a high-riot city and higher levels of rioting in the first place. For our analysis, we turn to the influence of the police-related preriot conditions and the effects these factors might have had on the riot rates.
OPINIONS ON THE LOCAL POLICING
Our general expectations with respect to policing are that higher levels of excessive force will fail to subdue riots in our target cities.
Furthermore, this relationship may be conditioned by a deeper history of preexisting relations and attitudes between the community and the police force. Thus, because San Francisco suffered more serious outbreaks of racial conflict vis-a'-vis Boston, we would expect that city to exhibit higher levels of excessive force and poorer police-community relations relative to Boston. The interaction of these two effects induces rioting both by generating a key grievance (concerns about police brutality) and by inflaming the development of existing riot events as they occurred. Table 1 gives results from the Roper Survey that inform these issues and establish the background for our preriot themes. From these results, three general patterns emerge. First, we find a consistent and simple race effect for the vast majority of the questions.
Whites in both cities generally had better opinions of police policy and practice than did Blacks (see also Campbell & Schuman, 1968;  Feagin & Hahn, 1973; Gamson & McEvoy, 1970) . Not only did Whites feel that police were doing a good job relative to Blacks, but they also felt that the police needed even more power to enforce the law-a view that Blacks did not share. Considering the racial composition of the police forces in each city (both predominantly white), these results are hardly surprising.
Second, we find evidence that supports the predicted relationship suggested by our second preriot theme, the preexisting policecommunity relations. Recall that we anticipate more favorable relations to lead to a lower incidence of rioting. Accordingly, Boston residents generally had more favorable opinions of police policy and practice than did San Francisco residents, lending support to our expectations. Finally, we find additional support for the relationship predicted by the racial polarization theme,4 the notion that greater attitudinal differences between Blacks and Whites will lead to greater conflict as predominantly Black protestors confront a White-majority police force. The differential between Black and
White opinion was indeed greater in San Francisco than in Boston, and this city-level difference appears consistently throughout our data. Thus, based solely on these initial patterns, we find (a) poorer police-community relations and (b) greater racial polarization of opinion in San Francisco relative to Boston. Given these data, San
Francisco's higher riot rate seems more than plausible.
In the survey data, Blacks in both cities cited police brutality as a primary cause of riots more often than Whites ( (Feierabend & Feierabend, 1972; Hibbs, 1973; Muller, 1985; Tilly, 1978) . Under these assumptions, we would expect to connect the harshness of policing to lower riot rates rather than the higher rates that our arguments suggest. Finally, with respect to the future role of police in Black neighborhoods, respondents were asked if these areas needed better police protection. In large part, the respondents of both cities advo- MAW is the group that sat in at the Roxbury office of the Department of Welfare and was forcibly ejected from the building . . . approximately 25 women and some men picketed the office ... approximately forty policemen came into the building and tried to forcibly eject them.
[Name] said that Deputy Sayre issued the order "Beat 'em, kill 'em, just get 'em out of here." She said that mothers were corralled and beaten by police and that she and other mothers threw their children to safety out of the windows of the building to people who had gathered around the building on the street. She said that many of the mothers were dragged, kicked, and pulled down the halls out of the door.
Clearly, the police played a central role in the escalation of the violence in Roxbury (a poor, predominantly Black Boston district). As the police were assailing the women, a large crowd began to amass outside the welfare building. The riot itself began when the agitated crowd reacted against the "arresting" officers. When questioned as to why the riot, once under way, had not spiraled even further, the respondent asserted "that a lot of the young adults and militants had demanded that the police be taken off the streets." In this scenario, the withdrawal of the police was crucial in de-escalating the conflict.
The Roxbury riot severely damaged police-community relations and although racial disturbances in Boston never paralleled San
Francisco's riot rate, the Roxbury riot marked the beginning of an increased level of collective conflict on the streets of Boston. Prior to the riot, the police force made no secret of their deterrent capabilities (the riot squad was heavily endorsed by the mayor), yet they had until then exercised restraint in the way they policed protest. As the story of the police behavior at Roxbury spread throughout Boston, the once respectable police force came to be perceived as abusive and illegitimate. It is, therefore, of little surprise that Black leaders developed a more unfavorable stance toward police when interviewed soon after.
POLICE DEPARTMENT PROFILES
Past research on the riot frequency has investigated the role of the police by including a measure of the size of the police force.
Two competing and antithetical notions drove the hypotheses in such tests. One reasoned that with increased repressive power, the authorities would be better able to maintain control, so increases in the size and fire-power of the police force would decrease rates of collective contention. The other recognized the character of the riots of the 1960s as products of confrontation between police and members of the Black community and reasoned that the stronger and more present the police were, the more likely these confrontations would be, and in turn, the more likely riots would be (Lieske, 1978) .
Three considerations complicate these simple relationships, Finally, having repressive potential does not necessarily mean that this potential will be realized through action. In fact, there is little evidence in the literature that suggests that the ability of social control agents to forcefully suppress protest equates to a willingness to do so. Clearly, the riot police that confronted protesters during the anti-apartheid demonstrations that swept U.S. campuses in the mid-1980s had more sophisticated and powerful repressive technology at their disposal than did police in the 1960s, yet inju-ries, property damage, and incidents of police brutality were nearly nonexistent despite the highly disruptive tactics employed by the demonstrators . Contrast these outcomes with the massacre at Kent State in 1970, when heavily armed national guardsmen fired on protesting students, killing four (Adamek & Lewis, 1973) . Taken Francisco police departments. Table 2 details the pertinent items from the ICMA data for both cities including general information about the personnel in each department and the preparedness for crowd control and riot response. These data show that in many respects, the two police departments were quite similar. For example, in both cities, the standard workweek for patrol officers was 40 hours and this number was not reduced in 1965 as it had been in other cities. No patrol officers in either city were involved in a nationally affiliated labor union or employee association (which may have increased the diffusion of policing techniques or departmental changes in response to rioting). With respect to riot control, both cities had formal plans for dealing with riots and demonstrations, both had mutual aid programs with other local law enforcement agencies through which assistance could be offered or requested when needed, and both cities had formal in-service training exercises including techniques of riot and crowd control.
There are important differences as well, however. To begin, the police department in San Francisco was considerably smaller than Boston's. At the time of the study, there were about 670,000 people would seem that the presence of sizable, well-trained control agents has a deterrent effect on riot escalation, whereas the violent deployment of those same agents has the opposite effect.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we set out to examine the role of policing in development of the riots of the 1960s. In documenting three areas of preriot conditions concerning police, we find that the data generally emphasize the importance of public attitudes toward the police, preparedness of the police department, and racial tension (measured by divergence of opinion) between Blacks and Whites.
We draw several conclusions with regard to the role of police in civil disorders in Boston and San Francisco based on these data. Racially selective policing often exacerbates protest situations, especially in areas with preexisting racial tensions. In some instances (such as peaceful protests, rallies, parades, etc.), it is often better for control agents to withhold direct repression and bear the cost of a limited event than to escalate the riot to something that no one can control. We are not suggesting that control agents abandon the policing of riots and protest altogether, as the complete absence of social control would clearly compromise innocent lives in a riot situation. Indeed, the purpose of this study is not to find a ready and simple solution to the complex and dynamic interactions between police, civilians, and the outbreak of violence. Rather, the aim is to call attention to a prevalence of observations that we feel accurately represents general patterns of police behavior, frequently observed consequences, and the conditions under which these consequences are likely to be observed.
Nor are the findings a particularistic artifact of the 1960s. In Los Angeles in 1992, members of a police department infamous not only for its abuses and brutality, but also for its poor relationships with Black residents, were responsible for the severe beating of a reckless motorist, Rodney King. The ensuing acquittal of the aggressing officers simply verified the long-standing beliefs that a discriminatory justice system would protect White police officers and allow them an even freer hand to abuse and brutalize Blacks.
Faced with an unjust authority, Blacks responded with rioting, just as they did in the 1960s. Other factors such as poor communication and disorganization among police further contributed to the excessive length and severity of the riot (Webster & Williams, 1992) . 
